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South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and an-
other 1999 (11) BCLR 615 
The case deals with the question of whether it is constitutional to pro-
hibit members of the armed forces from participating in public protest 
action and from joining trade unions. The Transvaal High Court. Hartzen-
berg J. declared section 126B of the Defence Act 44 of 1957 to be 
unconstitutional and invalid in as far as it prohibited members of the 
South African National Defence Force (SANDF) from engaging in public 
protest and from joining trade unions. In accordance with the Constitu-
tional requirements the order of unconstitutionality was referred to the 
Constitutional Court for confirmation. 
Section 126B( 1) prohibited a member of the permanent force (core mili-
tary personnel) from becoming a member of any trade union as defined 
in the Labour Relations Act although it permitted such a member to be-
long to a professional society or association or a similar body approved by 
the minister. Section 126B(2) enjoined that a member of the SADF shall 
not strike or perform any act of public protest or participate in any strike 
or act of public protest. Contravention of the above was a criminal of-
fence. The term 'public protest' was defined in very broad terms including 
'holding or attendance of any meeting. assembly, rally, demonstration, 
proceSSion, or other gathering: which was intended ro influence, support, 
promote or oppose any proposed or actual policy, action, or decision of 
the Government of South Africa or another country or territory. Prohibi-
tion of public protest also covered conduct in support of or opposition to 
private interests or those of a parastatal. 
The Respondents, the Minister of Defence and Chief of the Defence 
Force opposed confirmation of the order of invalidity in as far as joining of 
a trade union was concerned but did not oppose the order relating to the 
invalidity of the prohibition against strike action and public protest. The 
Constitutional Court, however, decided to examine the constitutionality of 
all the prohibitions originally challenged. 
Prohibition of participation in acts of public protest 
O'Regan J. delivering the majority judgment held that prohibition against 
participation in acts of public protest was in violation of the right to free-
dom of expression entrenched in section 16 of the South African 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
"public protest" was defined made it very difficult to determine what 
conduct was proscribed and what was noe Freedom of expression. the 
judge said, was at the heart of a democracy, a guarantor of democracy 
and facilitated the search for truth by individuals and as a whole, 
The court observed that although members of the Defence Force need-
ed to act in a manner that inspired confidence and trust in the dispassion-
ate observance of their duties and that to do so required that they may not 
act in a partisan political fashion in the performance of their duties. never-
theless, the prohibition against participating in public protest went much 
further than was necessary to achieve that objective. Members of the 
Defence Force remained members of society with rights of citizenship, 
The sweeping prohibition was a grave incursion on the fundamental rights 
of soldiers and not a justifiable limitation on the right of soldiers to free-
dom of expression. The provisions were therefore inconsistent with the 
constitution. The court held that the offending provisions could be ren-
dered constitutional by severing the references to "acts of public protest" 
from the relevant section and leave the prohibition as only applicable 
against strike action and incitement to strike. The applicant union did not 
seek to challenge this and it was so ordered. 
Prohibition of membership of trade unions 
The applicant argued that the prohibition against membership of a trade 
union in the Defence Act was contrary to the constitutional right of every 
worker to form and join a trade union. On the other hand the respondents 
argued that members of the armed forces were not workers and that even 
if they did constitute workers, the infringement of their right was justified 
in terms of the limitation clause in the Constitution. The respondents 
further argued that the defence force could not be a disciplined milirary 
force as required by the Constitution if members were allowed to form 
and join trade unions and to exercise their rights in that capacity. 
After considering provisions of the Freedom of Association and Protection 
of the Right to Organise Convention, 87 of 1948 of the International Labour 
Organisation, O'Regan J found that the ILO regards members of the armed 
forces and police to be workers but that the extent to which the provisions 
of the Convention were to apply to them was a matter for national law. In 
the context of South Africa, O'Regan J found that although members of the 
Defence Force may not be employees in the full contractual sense of the 
word, their conditions of enrolment in many resembled those of 
the people employed under a contract of employment. The court found, 
therefore, that the prohibition in the Defence Act against the joining of trade 
unions by members of the force was a violation of their constitutional right 
as workers to form and join trade unions and was therefore invalid. 
The argument of the respondents that infringement of the right was 
justified by the constitutional requirement [0 structure the Defence Force 
as a 'disciplined military force' was The court held that allowing 
members of the Defence Force to join trade unions, if properly regulated, 
would not necessarily undermine the discipline and efficiency of the 
Defence Force. Limitations could be imposed if they were in compliance 
with the limitation clause, that is, if they were justifiable in a democratic 










































A SUMMARY OF SOME RECENT CASES OF INTEREST TO THE AFR1CAN CONTINENT 
This case should be of interest to other African countries with similar 
constitutional protection of workers but which at the same time prohibit 
members of the Defence Forces and Police from joining trade unions or 
engaging in public demonstrations or other forms of public protest. For 
instance, section 31 (2) of the Malawi Constitution of 1995 provides that 
"All persons shall have the right to form and join trade unions or not to 
form or join trade unions," Section 35 provides for freedom of expression 
and section 38 guarantees every person the "right to assemble and dem-
onstrate with others peacefully and unarmed", The provisions in the 
Lesotho Constitution of 1 993 are rather more problematic and more likely 
to benefit from the interpretation in the South African case, Every person 
is entitled to the rights co freedom of expression [14 (I)], freedom of 
peaceful assembly [section 15 (1)] and freedom of association, including 
for labour purposes, [section 16 (I )], However, all these rights are qualified 
by the further provision that laws may be made limiting those rights "in 
the interests of defence. public safety. public order, , ," 
Restrictions are also imposed by the Constitution of Namibia. 1990, on 
the enjoyment of fundamental rights including the right to associate in 
trade unions and the right to freedom of expression and assembly [section 
21), Many of the other African countries do not recognise the right to form 
and join trade unions in their constitutions although most provide for (at 
least on paper) freedom of expression and assembly, 
Banana v Attorney-General 1999 (1) BCLR 27 (25) (Zimbabwe) 
The case is about the right of an accused person to a fair hearing by an 
independent and impartial court, on the one hand. and the right of the 
press to freedom of expression and the duty to inform the public on 
matters of public interest, on the other, 
The applicant. Canon Banana. a former non-executive president of 
Zimbabwe was accused by Jeftha Dube. defendant in a murder trial, of 
committing acts of sodomy and other homosexual acts over a number of 
years while Dube was serving as applicant's aide de camp. Dube was 
convicted of murder with extenuating circumstances as the court accepted 
his uncontroverted claim that he had been traumatised as a result of 
repeated homosexual abuse by the applicant 
The applicant was subsequently indicted on several counts of sodomy, 
attempted sodomy and indecent assault. The allegations against him 
r:eceived considerable publicity in the media. At the beginning of the trial, 
the applicant moved an application for a permanent stay of proceedings 
on the grounds that there was a real risk that he would not receive a fair 
trial because of the pre-erial publicity and statements as to inadmissible 
evidence set out in the outline of the state's case. The application was 
based on the provisions of section 18(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
which guarantees the right of an accused to a fair hearing before an 
independent and impartial court, The questions raised were referred by 
the preSiding High Court judge to the Supreme Court as they raised impor-










































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
The main issue raised in the case as formulated by Gubbay CJ was 
"whether widespread publicity, adverse and hostile to an accused person 
may so indelibly prejudice the minds of the judge and assessors at the 
criminal trial as to negate the constitutional protection of a fair hearing 
before an independent and impartial court". 
The Supreme Court noted the "political tension between the right of the 
press to freedom of expression in the conveyance of information to the 
public and the right of an accused person to a fair hearing". The court 
observed that a crucial element of a fair trial is the right to be tried solely 
on the evidence before the court and that the fairness and impartiality of 
the criminal process was the cornerstone of the legal system. On the other 
hand, freedom of expression was a right and enjoyment always to be 
jealously guarded. It was a "core value of society essential to truth, de-
mocracy and personal fulfilment". Freedom of the press was also crucial 
to the public nature of the administration of justice and the potential for 
scrutiny that comes with such openness. The judicial process had always 
been a matter of legitimate public interest. The people had a right to know 
and the press did a valuable service in informing them. However, occa-
sionally restrictions on the freedom of expression and the press were 
necessary and acceptable in a free and democratic SOCiety as the rights 
were not absolute. In respect of legal proceedings, freedom of the press 
had to be exercised reasonably. What had to be balanced was the right of 
the public to information and that of the media to report and express 
views freely, against the right of an accused person to a fair trial. 
The court stressed that in a hierarchy of constitutional rights, the right to 
receive a fair trial had to take precedence over freedom of the press. 
Gubbay CJ summarised the rule as follows: 
"Media reporting of a Judicial process, or in advance of it, may in exceptional 
circumstances, be so irresponsible and prejudicial as to make the unfairness 
irreparable and the administration of justice impossible. If that were to occur 
. the court would have no option but to grant a stay of proceedings, for it is 
more important to retain the integrity of the system of justice than to ensure 
the punishment of even the vilest offender." 
The court considered the articles published in the press about the appli-
cant Shortly after the Dube judgment. Some of the articles inferred that 
applicant's homosexual activities went far beyond those acts alleged by 
Dube and that Dube's claims "might just have opened a can of worms". 
The court accepted the argument for the applicant that the cumulative 
effect of the publicity was to induce a belief that the applicant had a 
propensity to homosexuality and was guilty not only of the charges for 
which he was to be prosecuted but many other similar offences. 
Having noted that the applicant enjoyed a significant amount of notori-
ety, being a former president, a professor and religious leader, therefor an 
extremely newsworthy person against whom grave crimes were alleged, 
the court found that the media had every right to report on this matter of 
public interest. Nevertheless, the articles went beyond the acceptable 
standard of fair, temperate and unbiased reporting that a high profile 










































A SUMMARY OF SOME RECENT CASES OF INTEREST TO THE AFRICAN CONTINENT 
The court then considered whether the pretrial publicity had been of 
such magnitude that the accused could not have a fair trial. Taking into 
account the process of appointing judges, the quality of judges and asses-
sors Gubbay, CJ. expressed the view that "only a remote possibility exists 
of a judge imbued with basic impartiality, legal training and power of 
objective thought, being consciously or subconsciously influenced by 
extraneous matter", He argued that to think otherwise would mean that it 
would be impossible to find an impartial judge for a high profile case and 
that such an accused could never receive a fair trial with the result that 
people who had committed crimes would go free, 
The court concluded that applicant had failed to discharge the burden of 
establishing the existence of a real or substantial risk of not being afforded 
a fair trial before the High Court. The application for a permanent stay of 
proceedings was therefore dismissed, 
The well argued judgment should be of considerable interest around the 
continent, especially in cases of corruption and fraud by public officials in 
countries like South Africa, Uganda. Nigeria and others where such cases 
are becoming common and where the vibrant press ruthlessly reports on 
such cases, It is interesting to note that the case arose out of a prosecution 
for alleged acts of homosexuality at around the same time that the South 
African Constitutional Court declared the crime of sodomy unconstitu-
tional for being inconsistent with the right not to be discriminated against 
on the basis of sexual orientation, See National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 {CCl, 
August ('i Another v Electoral Commission and Others 1999 (4) BCLR 
363 (CC) 
The case concerns the right of prisoners, both those awaiting trial and 
those already convicted, to vote in national elections, The applicants, a 
convicted prisoner and an awaiting-trial prisoner, failed to get assurance 
from the Electoral Commission that they would be able to vote in the 
impeding national elections, They then jointly applied to the Transvaal 
High Court for the appropriate relief. The court dismissed the application 
on the ground that failure on the part of the Commission to make ar-
rangements for applicants to vote was not an undue limitation of the 
applicant's constitutional right to vote, The Electoral Act 73 of 1998 re-
quired that to be able to vote a person amongst other things must have 
registered in a "voting district in which that person is ordinarily resident", 
The prisoners had not been able to register in the districts where they 
were ordinarily resident as they were in prison, The court held that if a 
person did something which deprived him or her of the opportunity to 
register as a voter or to vote. he or she had only himself or herself to 
blame, The applicants had deprived themselves of the opportunity to 
register and vote and it was not the fault of the respondents, 
The applicants filed an application in the Constitutional Court for leave to 
appeal to that court against dismissal of their application on the basis of the 
right to vote. the right to equality and the right to dignity, They sought a de-
claration that they and all other prisoners were entitled to register and vote 
in the forthcoming elections and an order directing the respondents to make 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
The respondents argued that nothing had been done by them to limit 
the applicants' right to register or vote. They contended that there was 
difficulty in determining the ordinary residence of a prisoner, whether it 
was the place of residence before incarceration or the prison. They further 
argued that if either interpretation would pose immense logistical, finan-
cial and administrative difficulties. 
The Constitutional Court, however. said it was not persuaded about the 
existence of any insuperable problems that would arise if it was deter-
mined that ordinary residence for prisoners meant prison. Further, it was 
said that even in the· case of an interpretation that the last residence prior 
incarceration was the place of residence for prisoners, no explanation had 
been given why provision of special votes for prisoners could not be 
provided just like for those in hospitals or in diplomatic missions abroad. 
The court affirmed that the constitutional right to vote imposed positive 
duties on the legislature and the executive. The first respondent had the 
obligation to take reasonable steps to ensure that eJigible voters were 
registered. Universal adult suffrage on a common voters role was one of 
the foundational values of the entire constitutional order. 
Sachs J, delivering the judgment of the court. observed that under the 
common law, prisoners retained their rights when they went to prison 
except those taken away by law expressly or by implication. In South 
Africa, the Constitution had reinforced and entrenched common-law 
rights. Rights could not be limited without justification and legislation 
dealing with voting had to be interpreted in favour of enfranchisement 
rather than disenfranchisement. Parliament had not passed a law limiting 
the right of prisoners to vote in terms of section 36. The court did not 
decide whether parliament could limit the right to vote in respect of some 
prisoners such as those convicted of murder, robbery or rape as the matter 
did not arise. However. there is a hint from judge Sachs that if parliament 
had passed a law limiting the right of such prisoners, as was the case in the 
Electoral Act of 1993 which limitation was authorised by the 1993 Interim 
Constitution. the court would probably have found it justified. 
The court rejected the view that the prisoners had lost their opportunity 
to exercise their right through their misconduct. The first respondent had 
failed to make arrangements to enable prisoners to vote and had not 
complied with the obligation to take reasonable steps to enable eligible 
persons to register and vote. Judge Sachs suggested a number of ways in 
which it could be made feasible for prisoners to vote; for instance the 
setting up of polling stations in the prisons or providing special votes 
which could then be transported to stations outside prison. 
The court concluded that the applicants had established a threatened 
breach of their rights to vote. Respondents had not complied with their 
obligations to take reasonable steps to create the opportunity to enable 
eligible voters to register and vote. The application for leave to appeal was 
granted and the appeal allowed. The court declared that all persons who 
were prisoners during the registration period and were nor excluded from 
voting by law were entitled to vote if they had registered. The respondents 
were ordered to make all necessary arrangements to enable prisoners to 










































A SUMMARY OF SOME RECENT CASES OF INTEREST TO THE AFRICAN CONTINENT 
An interesting point that was raised but dismissed was that a concentrated 
prison electorate would exercise a disproportionate local influence on election 
results if prisoners were allowed to vote. In the circumstances of South 
Africa which has the proportional representation electoral system based on 
party lists, distortion of the outcome was unlikely. This could however, be 
a real danger in those countries with a constituency-based electoral system. 
The case provoked some public reaction in the press and the electronic 
media. with members of the public complaining that murderers, robbers 
and rapists were being allowed to vote while law abiding citizens who 
could not register, for one reason or another, for instance because they 
were out of the country on business or studying. were denied the oppor-
tunity to vote. It is possible that the government will initiate legislation to 
limit the right of certain categories of prisoners to vote in future elections. 
This case should be of considerable constitutional and political interest 
to neighbouring and other countries, particularly in those third world 
countries where prisoners are often treated as lesser human beings who 
do not deserve to exercise their political rights. It should policy-makers 
in many African countries thinking about giving voting rights to most if 
not all categories of prisoners. 
Kohlhaas v Chief Immigration Officer and Another 1998 (6) BCLR 757 
(ZSC) (Zimbabwe) 
This case concerns the right of a wife who is a citizen of Zimbabwe to 
have her alien husband live with her in Zimbabwe on a permanent basis. 
The case also discusses the question of marriage of convenience as a 
factor that could defeat the wife's right. The case arose because previous 
to this and two other cases discussed below, a foreign woman married to 
a Zimbabwean man automatically acquired Zimbabwean citizenship 
whereas a foreign husband of a Zimbabwean woman could nor. This 
practice, though patently discriminatory, was seen by the state as being in 
accordance with African culture. A man can marry a woman from any-
where and bring her into his community but not the other way round. The 
same practice is in fact recognised in the laws of a number of African 
countries based on similar justification. 
Mr Kohlhaas, a German national, was resident in Zimbabwe as a holder of 
a temporary permit, renewed from time to time, from 1988 until 1996. In 
December 1996 he was informed that his permit would not be renewed and 
that he would have to leave the country by 21 January 1997. He, however, 
managed to get a temporary visitor's visa to stay until April 1997 to wind up 
his affairs in Zimbabwe. In the meantime, he met the applicant and after a 
short courtship they got married on 1 February 1997. 
The applicant sought an order directing the Zimbabwean Government 
to grant her husband permanent resident status and to permit him to 
work. The Supreme Court referred to two previous decisions of the court 
in which similar issues were considered, In Rattigan & others v Chief Immi-
gration Officer 1994 (2) ZLR 54(S), 1995 (J) BCLR(ZS) the Supreme Court 
declared that a female citizen of Zimbabwe married to an alien was 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Zimbabwe constitution, to live permanently with her husband in Zim-
babwe. The court reasoned that to prohibit the alien husband would 
"place the wife in a dilemma of having to decide whether to accompany 
her husband to a country other than Zimbabwe and live with him there or 
to exercise her constitutional right to continue living in Zimbabwe without 
him." This would undermine her right as a citizen to live in Zimbabwe. In 
Salem v Chief Immigration Officer and another 1994 (2) ZLR 287(S), 1995 
(1) BCLR 78 (ZS) the ruling in Rattigan was extended to cover the right of 
the alien husband to lawfully engage in employment or other gainful 
activity in Zimbabwe on the basis of the wife's right to freedom of move-
ment. The Rattigan and Salem decisions led the government to move to 
limit the ability of foreign husbands of local women to become permanent 
residents in Zimbabwe. The Constitution was amended permitting the 
imposition of restrictions on the freedom of movement or residence 
within Zimbabwe of persons who are neither citizens nor permanent 
residents of Zimbabwe permitting the exclusion or expulsion of such 
persons whether or not they are married or related to other persons who 
are citizens or are permanently resident in Zimbabwe. 
The respondents opposed the application on the grounds that the con-
stitutional amendment permitted the denial of permanent residence to 
and expulsion of Mr Kohlhaas. They further argued that applicant's mar-
riage was a marriage of convenience contracted with the main purpose of 
evading immigration laws. 
The court held that if the applicant had been Mr Kohlhaas he would have 
been met with the "unassailable answer that the decision was justified" 
under the law. But the applicant was the wife and it was her right to 
freedom of movement as a citizen of Zimbabwe which was under consid-
eration. The court held that there was nothing in any law that qualified her 
right as a citizen to move freely and to reside anywhere in Zimbabwe and 
to be immune from expulsion from Zimbabwe. This right included the en-
titlement of the applicant wife to have her alien husband reside with her in 
Zimbabwe. According to the court, this position, established in Rattigan and 
Salem, was not altered by the constitutional amendment as the amendment 
only affected non-citizens. Thus Mr. Kohlhaas would not have been able to 
assert a right to stay with his wife although the reverse was permissible. 
On the allegation that the marriage was one of convenience entered 
into to defeat the law, the court discussed the criteria for determining that 
a marriage is an impermissible one. A marriage would be such if not only 
there is proof that the marriage was entered into with the primary pur-
pose of evading immigration laws but also that there was a lack of 
intention to live together permanently as husband and wife. Absence of 
either of these would leave the marriage intact as a legal marriage. In the 
present case it had not been proved that the couple had no intention of 
living together permanently as husband and wife. The evidence was 
indeed to the contrary. 
In the result, the court allowed the application declaring that the appli-
cant's right to freedom of movement including the right to reside in 
Zimbabwe with her husband had been contravened by the actions of the 










































A SUMMARY OF SOME RECENT CASES OF INTEREST TO THE AFRlCAN CONTINENT 
under the Constitution to have her husband residing with her in 
Zimbabwe, Mr Kohlhaas was to be issued with the written authority to 
remain in Zimbabwe like any other alien who is a permanent resident. 
Mr Kohlhaas was also to be accorded the same rights as other alien per-
manent residents to be employed or to engage in other gainful activity in 
any part of Zimbabwe without restriction. 
This case is part of a growing jurisprudence on the right of a woman to 
have her alien husband reside with her in her home country. It is impor-
tant in the context of the situation in many countries, as indicated earlier, 
whereby an alien wife of a citizen may automatically or on application 
qualify for citizenship while an alien husband married to a citizen may not 
and may be denied entry into the country of his spouse or once there may 
be expelled. A related issue arose in the Botswana case of Attorney-General 
v Dow 1994 (6) BCLR 1 (Botswana) in which the respondent (the applicant 
at trial) sought an order declaring certain sections of the Citizenship Act 
unconstitutional on the ground that they discriminated against female 
citizens. Under the Act, children born of a marriage between a citizen 
husband and an alien wife, acquired the citizenship of Botswana at birth 
while those born of a citizen wife and an alien husband did not and had to 
follow the citizenship of their father whose position in the country was 
tenuous. The trial court held that the relevant provisions of the Citizenship 
Act were unconstitutional as they were discriminatory on the basis of 
gender. The appeal court dismissed the appeal by the Attorney-General. 
The court rejected appellant's argument that the framers of the constitu-
tion must be taken to have intended to permit discrimination on the basis 
of gender since sex or gender were not included in the prohibited grounds 
of discrimination and as the whole fabric of customary law in Botswana 
was based on that society being patrilineal and amenable to discrimina-
tion on the basis of gender. The court preferred a generous, liberal, non-
technical and purposive approach to interpreting the constitution to find 
that prohibition against discrimination included that based on sex or 
gender. It is hoped other jurisdictions in Africa will follow these cases in 
outlawing discrimination and promoting the rights of women. 
Speaker of the National Assembly v Patricia De Lille MP and the 
Panafricanist Congress of Azania 1999 (11) BCLR 1339 (SCA) 
The case raises two main issues: the power of the National Assembly to 
suspend a member of the assembly and the right of a member to freedom 
of expression. At the trial court, in De Lille and another v Speaker oj the 
National Assembly 1998 3 SA 430 (Cl, two further issues, bias on the part 
of a parliamentary committee investigating misconduct by a member of 
the National Assembly and the right of such a member to a fair hearing, 
were raised. However, these latter issues were found by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal not to be crucial to the result of the appeal and were not 
decided. These latter issues are not discussed here. 
The first respondent, a member of the National Assembly, made allega-
tions in the House to the effect that twelve members of the ruling party, 
the African National Congress (ANCl had been accused of having been 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
were true. she called on the Government to "tell the public at large who 
the agents are who received blood money to betray the genuine struggle 
of the African people." The statement provoked a number of interventions 
from members of the Assembly and she was challenged to name the 
alleged "spies". She took the challenge and named eight people including 
some who were not members of the Assembly. 
The Speaker ruled that it was unparliamentary to refer to members of 
the Assembly as "spies" and to name them. The respondent was asked to 
withdraw the offending part of the statement. The respondent withdrew 
her statement. 
It appeared that the Speaker was satisfied with the withdrawal of the 
statements. However. an ANC member of the house proposed a motion to 
appoint an ad hoc committee of the House to investigate and report on the 
conduct of the respondent with regard to the statements. The motion was 
adopted by a majority. The Committee was duly appointed consisting of 
eight ANC members and seven from the opposition and chaired by an 
ANC member. 
The committee recommended that the respondent be directed to 
apologise to the Assembly by a letter addressed to the Speaker and be 
suspended for fifteen parliamentary working days. The National Assembly 
by resolution adopted the recommendations and added that the apology 
also be extended to the individual members of the Assembly who the 
respondent had named in her remarks. 
The respondent made an application in the Cape High Court attacking 
the resolutions of the committee and the Assembly regarding her suspen-
sion on the ground that the majority of the members of the committee 
were biased against her. were mala Jide and had not afforded her a fair 
hearing before adopting the resolutions. The Cape High Court upheld her 
application and granted an order declaring void the relevant resolutions of 
the Assembly. 
The speaker appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal arguing that the 
evidence on affidavit relied on by the trial court did not justify the finding 
that the majority of the committee or the assembly were biased against 
the respondent or were malaJide or that they failed to give the respondent 
a fair hearing before passing the resolutions. 
The appeal court. Mohamed CJ delivering the judgment of the majority. 
decided that the main issue was not whether the committee and the 
Assembly had been biased or mala Jide or whether the respondent had 
been afforded a fair hearing but rather "whether or not in the circumstances 
... the Assembly had any lawful authority to take any steps to suspend 
the respondent from Parliament." Mohamed CJ pointed to constitutional 
supremacy as the basis of the South African legal order, how every law 
and every act of Parliament or any other institution had to be in confor-
mity with the constitution and that they were all not immune from judicial 
scrutiny. The court therefore had to investigate whether Parliament had 
acted contrary to the Constitution when its conduct was challenged. 
The appellant relied on the power of the National Assembly to "deter-










































A SUMMARY OF SOME RECENT CASES OF INTEREST TO THE AFRICAN CONTfNENT 
[Section 57 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 108 of 
1996]. The court found this power was enough to enable the Assembly to 
maintain internal order and discipline by means which it considered 
appropriate. This included the power to exclude from the Assembly, for 
temporary periods. a member who was disrupting or obstructing its 
proceedings. However, the court found that the respondent had not been 
suspended for disrupting or obstructing or unreasonably impeding the 
management of the business of the Assembly, but as a kind of punish-
ment for making a speech some days earlier which was not obstructive or 
disruptive but which some members of the Assembly considered objec-
tionable and unjustified. 
The question was therefore not whether the Assembly had the authority 
to suspend the respondent in order to maintain orderliness in its pro-
ceedings but whether it was entitled to suspend the respondent as a 
punishment for an objectionable statement. This led to consideration of 
the respondent's right to freedom of expression in the Assembly. 
Section 58( I) (a) of the constitution provides that cabinet members and 
members of the Assembly have freedom of speech in the Assembly and 
its committees subject to its rules and orders. The appellant argued that 
the right was also subject to other privileges and immunities of the As-
sembly as prescribed by national legislation [58(2)]. These privileges and 
immunities, it was argued, were contained, by reference, in the law and 
custom of parliament in the United Kingdom saved in Act 19 of 191 1 
which provided that members of the South African House of Assembly 
would enjoy the same privileges as enjoyed by the House of Commons of 
the UK. Act No 19 of 191 1 was saved by Act 32 of 1961 which stated that 
the privileges and immunities of the Assembly would be those applicable 
at the time of independence in 1961 and which was in turn saved by the 
current Powers and Privileges of Parliament Act of 1963. 
Mohamed CJ rejected this "edifice" which appellant sought to erect by 
"incorporating a reference to other laws which in turn incorporate further 
laws which incorporate the parliamentary law and custom of the United 
Kingdom which arguably allows the suspension of members of Parliament" 
and which appellant sought to justify in terms of the 1996 Constitution. 
Mohamed CJ pointed out that the threat that a member of the Assembly 
may be suspended for something said in the Assembly inhibits freedom of 
expression and adversely impacted on the guarantee given by section 58 
(I )(a). Provisions regarding other "privileges and immunities" of Parliament 
had to be interpreted in such a way as not to detract from that guarantee. 
The right to freedom of expression was entrenched while legislation had 
to conform with the constitutional provisions and construed taking into 
account the values of the Constitution. In particular the internal rules of 
Parliament had to have "due regard to representative and participatory 
democracy". 
The Powers and Privileges of Parliament Act, 1963, provides mecha-
nisms [Q diSCipline and punish members of the Assembly for contempt of 
parliament including the kind of misconduct committed by respondent. 
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has not been paid. No provision, however. is made for suspension as a 
form of punishment. The appellant sought to rely on Rule 77{A)(l) of the 
standing Rules of the Assembly which makes freedom of speech and 
debate in the House "subject to the restriction placed on such freedom in 
terms of the Constitution, any other law or rules." However, this was 
rejected by the court on the basis that the Constitution provides no such 
restriction nor was there legislation which qualified the right to freedom of 
expression except for temporary exclusion of a member to maintain order 
in the Assembly. 
Mohamed CJ concluded: "The right of freedom of speech in the Assem-
bly is a fundamental right crucial to representative government in a 
democratic sOciety." It was held that the National Assembly had no consti-
tutional authority to suspend the respondent from the Assembly in the 
circumstances and the appeal was dismissed with costs. 
The case should be of interest to other countries especially in the former 
British colonies and protectorates which inherited the Westminister type 
of constitutional order at independence. Not only does it emphasise the 
importance of freedom of expression to the nurturing of democracy but it 
illustrates the departure from parliamentary supremacy whereby Parlia-
ment may pass any law however oppressive and not be censured by the 
courts, to constitutional supremacy under a constitution with an en-
trenched bill of rights and judicial review. 
Prince J D C Mpuga Rukidi v Prince Solomon Iguru Civil Appeal No 
18/94 (Supreme Court of Uganda) (decided 17/5/1996). 
Just as one thought that African kingdoms were in decline or dying if not 
already dead in this era of republican democracy, the inter-lacustrine 
kingdoms of Uganda were in the last few years, restored after being 
abolished for 27 years. 
This case concerns a struggle by two brothers for the throne of one of 
the oldest kingdoms in Uganda, Bunyoro-Kitara. The appellant, the eldest 
son of Sir Tito Winyi, the last Bunyoro-Kitara king before the kingdom was 
abolished in 1966, claimed that at the time of abolition, he was the crown 
prince and was recognised as such at official functions of the Kingdom 
and during visits to other countries and kingdoms. He argued that he, 
therefore was the rightful successor to the throne. He further argued that 
the respondent, his half-brother was not entitled to succeed to his father's 
throne as he was the issue of an incestuous relationship between the late 
king and respondent's mother. The allegation of incest was based on the 
fact that respondent's mother was a princess and closely related to the 
respondent's father and since, according to the appellant, princesses were 
not allowed by custom to marry, respondent was not born of a legitimate 
marriage. He was therefore, it was argued, not a member of the royal 
family and not entitled to succeed as required by the 1962 Uganda Consti-
tution. What complicated the issue further was that there was a will left by 
the late king, Tito Winyi in which the respondent was nominated to suc-
ceed to the throne. At the tria!, only a photocopy of the will was produced, 
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deposited for safekeeping by the late king. Although the appeJlant dis-
puted the admissibility of the will in evidence, the trial court, Tinyinondi J, 
admitted it as a valid nomination of respondent to the throne of Bunyoro-
Kitara. The appellant's argument that the will was not a valid will as it was 
not attested was rejected on the ground that wills by Africans did not 
require attestation to be valid. 
The court Further rejected the argument that the nomination had lapsed 
with the abolition of kingdoms. The trial court Found, and the appeal court 
agreed, that the right to be the heir and succeed to the throne of Bunyoro-
Kitara was an acquired right which subsisted despite the abolition of the 
kingdom. It was further held that even if the right had been lost with 
abolition, it was restored by the Constitution (Amendment) Statute of 
1993 which had paved the way for the restoration of kingdoms. 
On the question of the right of the respondent to succeed, the trial court 
held that Schedule Three of the 1962 Constitution which dealt with suc-
cession to the Bunyoro kingdom referred to nomination by the king from 
the "Royal line". Since Royal line or family was not defined, it was held to 
include all the king's sons. This contrasted with provisions regarding the 
kingdom of Toro where a successor was to be nominated first from a 
particular wife (omugowekitebe) before other potential successors could 
be considered and provisions relating to the Ankole kingdom where the 
successor was to be nominated first from the sons of the legally wedded 
wife (omwigarire). The respondent was therefore held to be a member of 
the royal family of Bunyoro and to have been properly nominated to 
succeed to the throne. 
This case is of interest not only on the issue of succession of traditional 
leaders, but also on the interaction between traditional institutions and 
modern democratic institutions. The 1962 Constitution of Uganda gave 
the reigning king the right to nominate an heir from among his sons. The 
1993 Constitution (Amendment) Statute which cancelled the abolition of 
kingdoms and made provision for their restoration stated that the institu-
tion of traditional ruler may exist "where the people of the community for 
which a person is to be Ruler" so desired and where it was "according to 
culture. customs and traditions of the people". 
A question raised in this case was how the wish of the people is to be 
determined. It emerged in the evidence that at council meetings of two of 
the three districts forming part of the kingdom of Bunyoro-Kitara. resolu-
tions had been passed calling for the restoration of the kingdom and 
expressing support for the respondent as the nominee of the late king to 
be the successor to the throne. It was argued by the appellant that the 
views of district councils, which were political institutions, were irrelevant 
to the issue of succession to the throne since they had nothing to do with 
custom or tradition. Tinyinondi J, however, held that by giving the "people 
of the community" the right to determine whether kingdoms should be 
restored and to determine who shall be their rulers, the legislators had 
intended to introduce "modern democratic monarchies". He found the 
fora at which the issue was deliberated (that is. the District Councils) to be 
sufficient for purposes of gauging the will of the people as required by the 
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required, those fora constituted "the people of the community". On ap-
peal, Odoki JSC agreed and observed that "it was common ground" that 
the people of Bunyoro-Kitara had popularly expressed a wish to have the 
institution of the Omukama (King) as the Traditional Ruler of Bunyoro-
Kitara restored. 
On the question of custom and tradition, Tinyinondi, j, found that there 
was no clear tradition as to succession to the throne since some kings had 
come to power through wars among siblings within the royal family, 
others peacefully through nomination and one as usurper. The only com-
mon element was that, except for one, a princess, all were either sons or 
brothers of previous kings. Colonial rule had since the 1933 Bunyoro 
Agreement introduced a requirement of nomination by the reigning king 
and approval by the governor. The requirement was later incorporated 
into the 1962 Constitution, substituting the President for the Governor. 
The 1993 Statute had, however, omitted the requirement of nomination 
and approval by the Governor or President and instead provided that if 
the people wished they may have the monarchy restored. The judge 
interpreted the provision that the person to become Ruler shall be deter-
mined in accordance with "the culture, customs and traditions of the 
community for which that person is to be Traditional Ruler" to mean that 
the people shall determine the person to be their Ruler. He further held 
the "culture, customs and traditions" in case of the Bunyoro-Kitara king-
dom to mean no more than that the person must be from the Babito 
dynasty and be a son or brother of the previous king, this being the mini-
mum content of the custom and tradition relating to succession to 
kingship in Bunyoro-Kitara. Thus, whereas the respondent had acquired 
his right to succeed to the throne through nomination in accordance with 
the 1962 Constitution, his nomination had been confirmed and strength-
ened by his acceptance by "the people of the community" in accordance 
with the democratic element introduced by the 1993 statute. The respon-
dent also satisfied the "custom and tradition" requirement as he was from 
the Babito clan and a son of the previous king (Omukama). 
The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' case with costs. The appeal raised 
the same issues as those at the trial. It was argued that the trial judge 
erred in holding that respondent was qualified to succeed Sir Tito Winyi as 
the Omukama of Bunyoro, erred in admitting the will in evidence and 
holding that it was a valid wilL The appellant also appealed against the 
order for costs. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the main 
issue but allowed the appeal on the award of costs to the respondent. The 
Supreme Court decided that as this was an important constitutional case 
determining who was to be the successor to the throne of Bunyoro-Kitara 
and as there was need for reconciliation in the community among the 
supporters of either party, each party should pay his own costs. 
The case is interesting on two issues raised. First, it shows that tradi-
tional leadership, even where it is not economically or politically 
Significant, is still keenly contested because of the high esteem in which 
traditional leaders are held by many, if not most, of the people in their 
areas of jurisdiction. Traditional leadership is even more prized where, like 
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important political role to playas well as controlling access to land in rural 
areas. Secondly. the case is interesting in demonstrating how an element 
of democratic choice can be infused in the determination of whether 
traditional institutions should continue to exist in this age of republicanism 
and democracy and even in the choice of the person to be a traditional 
leader. This may be relevant in South Africa where some traditional 
leaders are urging the government to restore the status of kingship in their 
areas (particularly in the Northern province and the Eastern Cape) and to 
bring them to par with the Zulu King. In some parts of the continent. 
traditional leadership is continually under stress while in others there are 
calls for restoration of defunct kingdoms. In both cases a mechanism may 
have to be found to determine the future of traditional leadership in 
accordance with the will of the people. 
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